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JOCK

A.

FINLAYSON*

J. CHRISTOPHER THOMASt

The Elements of a Canada-United
States Comprehensive Trade Agreement
I. Introduction
The last several months have witnessed important developments in the
trading relationship between Canada and the United States. In September
1985, the Canadian government, after months of intensive study, announced that it wished to launch negotiations with the United States aimed
at reaching a comprehensive, bilateral trade liberalization agreement. In
early December, President Reagan formally responded to this Canadian
request by informing Congress of his administration's intention to enter
into wide-ranging trade discussions with Canada. The House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee considered this question during the early months of 1986, and after
an emotional set of hearings the latter split 10-I10 when voting on whether
to commence negotiations. This tie vote allowed the Administration to
proceed with the trade talks. Formal negotiations began on May 21, 1986.
The Canadian-American trading relationship is the largest and most extensive in the world, with atwo-way trade flow in excessof$1 10billion(U.S.)
in 1985. Each country is the other's most important trading partner, but there
is a striking disparity in their relative dependence on bilateral trade. Canada
sends some three-quarters of its exports to the United States, and purchases
in excess of two-thirds of its importsfrom U.S. suppliers, whereas in the case
of the United States the comparable figures are in the range of 19-20 percent.
* Mr. Finlayson was formerly Director of Policy Analysis and Research, Business Council
on National Issues. He is Currently attending the Yale School of Management.
t Mr. Thomas is on the Faculty of Law. University of British Columbia and an Associate
of Ladner Downs, Barristers and Soliciters. Vancouver. He is currently an advisor to the
Minister for International Trade of the Government of Canada. The views expressed herein
are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the position of' the Government of Canada
or the Business Council on National Issues.
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Nonetheless, the United States trades more with a single Canadian province,
Ontario, than with Japan, its second largest trading partner. I
Despite the magnitude and rapid growth of bilateral commerce, no
formal bilateral legal or institutional framework has been developed to
regulate Canada-United States trade. Instead, both countries have primarily relied on the rules and the legal framework provided by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2 to govern their trade relationship, although a few bilateral arrangements have been put in place to deal
with particular issues or problem areas. For example, Canadian objections
to U.S. jurisdictional claims have led to a series of understandings in
3
respect of antitrust enforcement.
In light of the fact that serious trade negotiations between the two
countries have now begun, this article will consider how the legal and
institutional setting of Canada-United States trade may be altered as a
consequence of a new trade agreement. Specifically, it will discuss the
likely structure and content of a Canada-United States Comprehensive
Trade Agreement (CTA). This is done partly by considering the stated
negotiating objectives of the two countries, and partly by exploring the
provisions that have been written into bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements reached by other countries. Many of these agreements can provide
valuable clues as to how a Canada-United States trade agreement may
be drafted. At the same time, however, it is argued here that certain unique
features of the Canada-U.S. economic relationship-particularly the unusual degree of economic integration that has already occurred-suggest
that the two countries may need to develop innovative approaches to
address certain difficult trade issues.
It is not yet clear exactly what matters will be on the two countries' negotiating agendas. In general, tariffs, nontariff barriers at the federal and state/
provincial levels, and subsidy policies appear to be recognized as important
by both sides. In addition, the United States views obstacles to U.S. investment and exports of services as key issues, as noted by the United States
Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter, in his September 27th report to Pres-

1. The trading relationship is described in some detail in a Discussion Paper entitled,
How to Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to Export Markets, released by the Honorable

James Kelleher, Minister for International Trade (January 1985), at 4-6 [hereinafter cited as
Discussion Paper].
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GATT has been modified
in several respects since 1947. The current version is contained in 4 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (BISD) (1969).
3. The Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws of Mar. 9, 1984, reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 275 (1984), is the most recent agreement.
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ident Reagan on the prospects for bilateral talks.4 For its part, Canada views
more secure and enhanced access to the U.S. market (i.e., the reduction or
removal of the threat of contingency protection) as a central objective. 5 Thus,
the elements of a possible CTA considered below address not only trade in
goods and import relief protection, but also trade in services, investment,
and investment-related trade issues.
The following discussion takes note of a number of existing bilateral and
multilateral trade and investment treaties considered in the light of the special features of the Canada-United States relationship. 6 It reflects the view
that Canada must offer a creative negotiating package to the United States
if it is to succeed in attaining the central negotiating objective of more secure
access. It also assumes that it probably will be impossible to obtain congressional support for modifications of U.S. import relief laws unless Canada is
prepared to offer important safeguards to the United States. Finally, although the United States has just recently concluded a Free Trade Area
Agreement with Israel, 7 this paper addresses a wider variety of issues than
those canvassed in that agreement. The magnitude and complexity of our
relationship makes it categorically different from the U.S.-Israel relationship. U.S. imports from Israel amount to only 0.05 percent of total U.S. imports whereas U.S. imports from Canada amount to approximately 19-20
percent. 8 Moreover, the much greater degree of transborder direct investment, as well as other factors, points to a significantly more complex rela9
tionship than the United States-Israeli one.

4. Copy on file at

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.

5. Discussion Paper, supra note 1, at 17-18.
6. In particular, reference has been made to the Convention Establishing the European
Free Trade Association, the Treaty of Rome, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations Agreement, the Panama-United Kingdom Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and the Panama-United States Treaty Concerning the Treatment and
Protection of Investment [hereinafter cited as Panama-United States Treaty]. The latter was
done at Washington, Oct. 27, 1982, and is reproduced in 21 I.L.M. 1227 (1982).
7. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of Israel, done at Washington, Apr. 22,
1985. reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653 [hereinafter cited as United States-Israel Agreement]. The
United States Trade Representative (USTR) drew up a summary of the Free Trade Area
Agreement (copy on file at THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER) [hereinafter cited as USTR
Summary].
8. In 1982 the U.S. exported $1.5 billion worth of products to Israel; Israel exported $1.2
billion worth of products to the United States. USTR Summary, supra note 7, at 9.
9. Nevertheless, the U.S. is obliged to consult with Israel should it commence negotiations
with a view to concluding a trade agreement with a third country. Art. 18 (1) (b) and (2) of
the United States-Israel Agreement. supra note 7, provides:
(b) Before either Party commits itself to take any action, unilaterally or by agreement,
which would reduce the barriers to trade applicable to third countries, including those
with whom that Party intends to enter into a customs union free trade area . . . it
shall provide prior written notice to the other Party as far in advance as may be
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11. Preliminary Considerations
Before discussing the likely elements of a CTA, a number of preliminary
points should be noted. First, the type of agreement envisaged here would
be a free trade area agreement as defined by article XXIV of the GATT,
supplemented by rules on such matters as competition, services and investment. 10 Article XXIV states that the provisions of the General Agreement "shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties,
the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area or the adoption
of an interim agreement" leading thereto." However, there are certain
conditions that must be fulfilled under article XXIV. First, duties and
other regulations of commerce applicable to contracting parties that do
not become members of the free trade area "shall not be higher or more
restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing prior to the formation of the free trade area, or interim
agreement." 12 Secondly, the parties to a free trade area are under a duty
to "promptly notify" the contracting parties and "make available to them
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them
to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they
3
may deem appropriate."'
It is unlikely that Canada and the United States would wish at present
to create a customs union or a common market. A customs union requires
the member states to have a uniform external tariff as against imports
from other countries, whereas a free trade area does not. The logical
consequence of this technical difference is that a customs union "must
form a common commercial policy towards the outside world, unnecessary in the free trade area, which marks a more important difference
between how the two arrangements then develop." 14 A common market
would also require signatories to impose common external trade barriers
practicable.
2. If the Party affected by the proposed measure referred to in paragraph I requests
consultations with regard to such measures, the Party proposing the measure shall

afford adequate opportunity for consultations regarding the proposed measures.
10. Art. XXIV of the GATT, supra note 2, provides for an exemption from the application
of the GATT's most-favored-nation rule for free trade areas and customs unions concluded
by GATT members. On the importance of this GATT provision, see K. DAM, THE GATTLAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 274-95 (1970). GATT does not presently address such issues as competition law, trade in services, or investment.
11. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIV: 5.
12. Id. at art. XXIV: 5 (b).
13. Id. at art. XXIV: 7 (a). The precise meaning of art. XXIV is difficult to discern due
to drafting problems. See Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The
Legacy of a Misconception, 30 CHI. L. REV. 615 (1963); see also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 587-88 (1969).
14. J. LAMBRINIDIS, THE STRUCTURE,

(1965).
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vis-a-vis the rest of the world and, in addition, would require the free
movement of labor, capital and services. 15 In any bilateral trade pact, it
is clear that both countries will want to maintain a significant latitude for
independent policymaking in many areas. This suggests that an agreement
broadly similar to a free trade area would be considered preferable.
Under GATT rules, countries wishing to establish a regional trade arrangement must either obtain a waiver from the GATT's most-favorednation principle, or else negotiate a free trade area, customs union or an
"interim agreement" leading thereto. It is assumed here that Canada and
the United States would seek to negotiate an "interim agreement" leading
to the subsequent establishment, over time, of a bilateral trade arrangement consistent with GATT rules. The most important requirement of
article XXIV in this respect is that "substantially all trade" between the
parties be freed under the terms of the regional agreement. Previous
experience suggests that the freeing of trade in 80-90 percent of traded
goods is sufficient to meet this test. 16
A second preliminary point concerns whether a Canada-United States
CTA should be open-ended and thus permit other countries to join at a
later date. Both Ottawa and Washington may prefer that any future bilateral agreement be structured in such a way as to allow for subsequent
accession by other trading nations prepared to abide by the terms of the
agreement and to offer reciprocal concessions in exchange for free access
to the Canadian and U.S. markets. This view is particularly likely to find
favor in the two countries' other major trading partners in Europe and
Asia.
Third, it is important to consider the method of implementation of a
bilateral CTA under domestic law. Under U.S. law, there are basically
two options-an executive agreement and a treaty. The first would be
simpler to negotiate and possibly easier to get through Congress. As in
the case of the various trade accords negotiated by the United States
during the GATT Tokyo Round, a bilateral trade pact taking the form of
an executive agreement under U.S. law could be legislated through the
so-called "fast-track" procedure in Congress, whereby legislators would
either accept or reject the agreement as is within a specified time period
(i.e., no amendments are permissible). An alternative approach would be
to have a formal treaty, which requires the consent of two-thirds of the
Senate present. 17 This opens up the possibility that a CTA negotiated by
15. See B.

A

HAWK,

COMPARATIVE GUIDE

UNITED

STATES

COMMON

MARKET

AND

INTERNATIONAL

ANTITRUST,

423 (1st ed. 1979).

16. K. DAM, supra note 10, at 290-91; THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
Il1; CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS: CANADA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES 32-33 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Report].
17. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
AFFAIRS,
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the two governments could be significantly altered as a result of opposition
in the Senate. Because of this, a treaty is apt to be more difficult to
negotiate and implement than an executive agreement. The U.S. administration, when seeking to negotiate a treaty, must take account of the
views and priorities of key U.S. legislators, or else any agreement subsequently brought forward for Senate consideration may well be rejected.
Canada experienced this problem in the case of the 1979 East Coast
Fisheries Treaty, which failed to gain Senate consent owing to the determined lobbying of influential senators from the New England states.
Despite the probable difficulty of winning Senate approval for a CanadaUnited States trade treaty, a treaty would have certain advantages from
Canada's perspective. The U.S. Constitution provides that all treaties
entered into by the United States "shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land."' 18 Upon consent by the Senate and ratification by the President,
a treaty assumes the force and effect of a U.S. federal statutory provision.
Like federal statutes, treaties preempt all subsequent inconsistent state
laws and regulations, provided they are "self executing." 19 Several U.S.
Supreme Court cases have held that a valid, "self-executing" treaty overrides state laws on matters which, in the absence of the treaty, would
20
ordinarily be within the powers reserved to the states.
Among the three types of executive agreements possible under U.S.
law, 2 1 the so-called congressional-executive agreement, which arises, for
example, when Congress enacts legislation which for its execution requires or implies authority to conclude an international agreement on the
part of the President, would probably be the most effective way to implement a Canada-United States trade pact. Any international agreement
concluded as a congressional-executive agreement can also be concluded
by treaty; the judgment as to which procedure should be used is generally
a political one. 22 Agreements on tariffs and other trade matters are now
often effected by congressional-executive agreement in recognition of the
special role of the House of Representatives in regard to raising revenue.
Either a treaty or a congressional-executive agreement would be preferable to a so-called sole-executive agreement, which is neither negotiated
pursuant to congressional legislation nor authorized by an existing treaty,
because there is uncertainty about whether such agreements are on an

18. Id. art. VI, § 2.
19. A "self-executing" treaty directly establishes a rule of law defining rights and duties,
without the need for additional implementing statutes. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
20. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(revised) §§ 302, 306-08 (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 1980).
22. Id. § 307, Comment b.
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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equal footing with congressional
statutes except in areas of express ex23
ecutive constitutional powers.

Insofar as Canadian constitutional law is concerned, the question of
domestic implementation of a trade agreement is considerably more complicated. This is due primarily to two factors. First, unlike the United
States, Canada only gradually severed its colonial links, and its capacity
to conclude international treaties emerged in like fashion. (Canada's emergence as a fully sovereign nation was formally recognized in the 1931
Statute of Westminster 24 but its international personality may have been
acquired some eight years earlier. 25) Secondly, Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence has placed considerable emphasis on the notion of the exclusive legislative competence of the federal and provincial governments.
As one commentator has pointed out, this has tended to restrict the applicability of a strong paramountcy doctrine, 26 so that in matters such as
foreign relations, federal responsibility for international relations might
be paramount to an otherwise recognized provincial jurisdiction. The
development of jurisprudence dealing with the division of powers in the
federal state prior to judicial consideration of the federal treaty-making
power contributed to the present day conventional view of Canadian
constitutional law, namely, that where the federal government concludes
a treaty that would otherwise impinge on matters of provincial jurisdiction,
provincial legislation implementing the international obligation is required.
Although consultations with the provinces have taken place during past
GATT negotiating rounds, the federal government has traditionally exercised a relatively unfettered primacy in GATT negotiations and has not
had to seek formal provincial legislative involvement. This is basically
because the negotiations centered on matters that were clearly subject to
federal jurisdiction. The widening scope of GATT, and of the CanadaUnited States discussions, into areas of provincial jurisdiction raises questions about provincial participation in the negotiating process. Indeed, in
a "First Ministers Conference" held in late November of 1985, the principle of "full provincial participation" in trade discussions emerged. The
23. Cf. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that
an executive agreement that conflicted with an act of Congress was invalid), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).

24. 22 Geo. V., c. 4 (U.K.)
25. Reference Re: Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (No. I, 2, and 3), (1981),
I S.C.R. 753, 125 D.L.R. (3rd) I at 44 (majority per Laskin C.J.C., Dickson, Beetz, Estey,
McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer J. J.).
26. H. Scott Fairley, Jurisdiction Over International Trade in Canada: The Constitutional
Framework, Paper presented to the University of Windsor Conference on the Legal Framework for Canada/United States Trade, Sept. 20-21. 1985, to be published by Carswell Legal
Publishers in a volume entitled THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA/UNI[ED STATES
TRADE. See also P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 245-46 (2d ed. 1985).
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precise meaning of the principle (the provinces claim it confers a provincial
veto while the federal government claims it means full consultation only)
has yet to be determined. It is representative, however, of the serious
constitutional difficulties Canada presently faces in international trade
negotiations.
III. An Overview of a Possible Comprehensive Trade Agreement
Given the size and complexity of the Canada-United States economic
and trading relationship, it would be difficult to negotiate an agreement
that addressed all of the main issues in a definitive fashion. Neither party,
it is submitted, would or indeed should be willing to conclude an agreement
that did not provide for flexibility as the new relationship evolved and for
exceptions which in certain circumstances would permit the suspension
of an obligation. Moreover, it is not possible to forecast accurately all
new issues that might need to be resolved. Thus, in addition to the dispute
settlement and consultation provisions that would necessarily be a part
of an agreement, it would be prudent to create working groups pursuant
to the treaty, to consider issues deserving of further negotiation and areas
suitable for harmonization of domestic laws. In our view, therefore, the
parties would benefit from an open-ended agreement. The major elements
which we envisage as comprising a CTA are examined below.
IV. Major Elements of a Comprehensive Trade Agreement

A.

TARIFFS

The gradual phasing out of remaining tariffs in respect of most bilateral
trade in goods would be the cornerstone of a bilateral CTA consistent
with GATT rules. The Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement recently negotiated between Australia and New Zealand calls for the immediate elimination of tariffs not exceeding 5 percent ad valorem; for the
phasing out of tariffs of more than 5 percent, but not exceeding 30 percent
ad valorem, by 5 percentage points per year; and for the phasing out of
27
tariffs in excess of 30 percent ad valorem over a period of six years.
By 1987, most Canada-United States trade in goods will be largely tarifffree or subject to nuisance tariffs that have little protective effect. By that
date, it is estimated that 80 percent of Canada's industrial exports to the
United States will enter duty-free, and up to 95 percent will face tariffs
of 5 percent or less. For U.S. industrial exports to Canada, the comparable

27. The Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, art. 4:4 (a),
(b), and (c), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 946 (1983).
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figures will be 65 and 91 percent, respectively. 28 Thus, to a substantial
degree, Canada-United States trade in nonagricultural goods will already
be tariff-free by 1987. However, it is important to note that tariffs maintained by both countries in the past have inhibited trade in certain sectors.
Moreover, tariffs will still remain an important trade barrier in a number
of sectors, particularly in Canada, which has higher tariffs than the United
States. An eight to ten year transition period for the phasing out of bilateral
tariffs would seem to be appropriate, but since the adjustment burden is
likely to be more acute for Canada, it may be that different rates for
phasing out tariffs could be negotiated by the two countries.
As noted above, article XXIV of GATT specifies that "substantially
all" trade must be freed of tariffs and other restrictions in order for an
agreement to be acceptable in GATT. In practice, this requirement has
been interpreted quite flexibly. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
for example, is basically limited to trade in industrial goods, 29 although
special bilateral agreements with respect to trade in agriculture have been
negotiated by some EFTA signatories. In general, Canada and the United
States should not have much difficulty in convincing GATT that a bilateral
agreement covering, say, 90 percent of bilateral trade in goods (with selected services as well) is acceptable under GATT rules and according to
previous GATT jurisprudence.
Two approaches would be open to Canada and the United States. First,
they could decide simply to issue a declaration that a free trade area as
defined by GATT rules exists between them, and proceed to liberalize
trade further in various products or sectors. Second, they could conclude
an "interim agreement" leading to the eventual formation of a bilateral
free trade area. The declaratory approach is weakened by the fact that
only 65 percent of Canada's industrial imports from the United States will
be tariff-free by 1987, and that nontariff barriers will still be potent trade
impediments between the two countries. The interim agreement approach
thus would be preferable. This would require Canada and the United
States to adopt a clear plan and schedule for the removal of tariffs.
B.

EXCEPTIONS

All trade agreements contain provisions which spell out exceptions to
the general commitment to phase out tariffs (and other trade barriers).
As noted previously, a CTA is likely to contain certain exceptions. One

28. Senate Committee Report, supra note 16, at 9.
29. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, signed at Stockholm
on Jan. 4, 1960; entered into force on May 3, 1960; 370 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as
EFTA].
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important type of exception could relate to certain products, or categories
of products, that would be exempt from the elimination of tariffs or other
kinds of trade barriers (e.g., quantitative restrictions). The number of
such products must be kept small in order to ensure compliance with
GATT rules regarding the commodity coverage of acceptable regional
trade liberalization agreements. The idea of seeking exceptions from trade
liberalization must be considered in terms of the danger that the number
of sectors excluded could snowball. This suggests that exceptions should
be kept to a minimum. It is important to recognize that vulnerable industries in both countries can be cushioned from the impact of trade
liberalization through devices other than product exceptions. For example, tariffs can be removed more slowly in particularly sensitive sectors,
and special assistance measures (such as certain kinds of permissible
subsidies) can be used to ease the adjustment burden.
Having said this, it is possible that both countries may wish to exempt
at least a few industries from a bilateral free trade agreement, including
parts of agriculture and, perhaps in Canada, certain sensitive "cultural
industries." 30 Other regional trade pacts have exempted the agricultural
sector (e.g., the European Free Trade Area). 3 1 Exemptions would be
acceptable provided that the total volume of bilateral trade represented
by all these excluded sectors was kept relatively small. In order to ensure
that the number of excluded sectors and products is kept small, it would
be advisable for the two countries to start with the presumption that all
sectors will be covered, at least with respect to tariff-removal, and then
bargain over exceptions and exclusions.
C.

SAFEGUARDS

Most trade agreements allow for trade restrictions in the event that
sudden surges of imports disrupt, or threaten to disrupt, a particular
domestic industry, and that such an import surge is attributable to previously implemented trade barrier reductions negotiated under the terms
of the agreement. Article XIX, the key safeguard provision of the GATT,
allows for the application of special protective measures to deal with
situations of "serious injury" caused by increased imports of particular
products as a result of what are termed "unforeseen developments." ' 32
One of Canada's present concerns in its trade relations with the United
States is the potential for "side-swipe" safeguard actions. Under GATT

30.

R.

LIPSEY &

M.

SMITH.

TAKING THE INITIATIVE:

TURIBULENT WORLD 134-6, 143: & chap. 6, 94-102 (1985).
31. EFTA, supra note 29, at art. 2 1.
32. K. DAM, supra note 10, at 99-107.
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article XIII, trade measures instituted to safeguard domestic producers
are to be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. 33 Thus, even though Canadian producers may not be the cause of injury to U.S. producers, they
can be swept up by a safeguard action aimed at a third country. A CTA
could address the "side-swipe" problem by disciplining safeguard action
in respect of each party's products by restraining it to apply safeguards
only where the serious injury or the threat thereof is substantially caused
by the reduction or elimination of a duty as provided in the CTA. In
addition, it could provide an exemption from safeguard actions aimed at
third countries where, in the view of the importing party, the importation
of a product from the other CTA signatory is not a significant cause of
serious injury or the threat thereof. This would be similar to the approach
34
taken in article 5 of the recent United States-Israel Agreement.
A more difficult problem for Canada concerns the role that Congress plays
in the import relief process. From the foreign perspective, there is a disturbing
reluctance in the United States to accept a negative determination in an import
relief case brought before the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the
International Trade Commission (ITC). In recent years, although negative determinations have been made in several cases, nevertheless Canada has been
under pressure to impose "voluntary restraints" on certain exports to the United
35
States. The case of softwood lumber is a good example.
In 1982, a section 332 fact-finding investigation was undertaken by the
ITC to inquire into conditions relating to the importation of softwood into
the U.S. 36 This was followed by a countervailing duty petition. 370 U.S.
domestic producers alleged that Canadian softwood lumber received government subsidies and that the "stumpage" systems (or removal rights)
conferred countervailable subsidies on lumber production. The ITA found
that certain government programs in Canada did constitute subsidies, but
they were de minimis, accounting for less than 2.5 percent of import value
and hence were not countervailable. More importantly, the ITA found

33. Art. XIII, par. 1, of GATT, supra note 2, provides:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party ... unless the importation
of the like product of all third countries . . . is similarly prohibited or restricted.
34. United States-Israel Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 5.
35. On the lumber dispute, see G. Jansen, Canada-United States Trade Relations: The
Lessons of the Softwood Lumber Countervail Case (Conference Board of Canada 1984).
36. CONDITIONS RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER INTO THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF INVESTIGATION No. 332-125, USITC Pub.
1241, Apr. 1982 (conducted pursuant to section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982)).
37. Softwood Lumber from Canada, Determination of the Commission in Investigation
No. 701-TA-197 (Preliminary) Under Section 703 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, together with
the information obtained in the investigation, USITC Pub. 1320, Nov. 1982.
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that stumpage systems did not confer a subsidy, in the words of the Act,
38
to a "specific enterprise or industry."
Although it terminated the ITC proceedings, this negative determination
did not complete the import relief process. Activity shifted to Congress,
which was quite sympathetic to domestic producers' demands for relief.
A number of legislative initiatives emerged, two of the more notable being
Representative Weaver's Canadian Softwood Import Control Bill 39 and
Representative Gibbons' Natural Resource Subsidy Bill. 40 Neither bill
was enacted into law. Indeed, both encountered opposition from the
Administration. 4 1 Nevertheless, they must be taken very seriously by
foreign producers because they provide the Administration with clear
evidence of strong congressional interest in an important trade problem.
Congressional displeasure with Canadian softwood imports reached such
a level that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) indicated to
Canadian representatives that the issue needs to be dealt with before a
bilateral trade pact could be concluded. 4 2 In 1985, the USTR requested
an update of the 1982 section 332 investigation and a report was completed
in October. 43 More recently, in June 1986, the Commerce Department
announced that it would hear a new subsidy complaint being brought by
U.S. lumber producers. And on October 16, 1986, a preliminary determination of subsidy (reversing the 1983 finding) was made by the ITA.
The point to note is that a 1982 ITA determination that a countervailable
subsidy did not exist merely completed the first stage of a protracted trade
dispute. Responding to the formal apparatus for the resolution of trade
complaints and, in addition, to the Congress and the administration, requires close foreign attention and considerable resources in order to combat the threat of trade-restraining action. One of Canada's negotiating
objectives, therefore, may be to make the remedies available under a CTA
as exclusive as possible. This would inhibit Congress from responding to
special interests and legislating special exceptions to the CTA. Thus, an
Article dealing with "New Restrictions on Trade" (similar to that found
in the United States-Israel Agreement 44 could provide:
38. Id.

39. H.R. 1088, 99th Cong. Ist Sess. (1985).
40. H.R. 2451, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985).
41. For a discussion of Congress' treatment of Rep. Gibbon's proposed amendment to
the trade laws, see Bello & Holmer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a
Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297 (1984).
42. Private confidential interview Dec. 12, 1985. The issue has also been discussed on a
regular basis in Canada's financial newspapers. See also, Vision Lacking in Reagan Push
for Free Trade Pact, Financial Post (Toronto), June 14, 1986 at 10.
43.
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New customs duties on imports or exports, or any charge having equivalent

effect and new quantitative restrictions on imports or exports or any measure
having equivalent effect, may be introduced in the trade between the Parties
only if permitted by this Agreement or by the GATT as in effect on the date of
entry into force of this Agreement, and as interpreted by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to the GATT, and insofar as not inconsistent with this Agreement.

Another kind of safeguard discussed in connection with Canada-United
States trade liberalization is an employment or production guarantee. The
Auto Pact, 45 for example, contains safeguards with respect to Canadian
production. It has been suggested in Canada that production or employment safeguards should be included in a trade agreement. However, it
seems to us that there is virtually no possibility that the United States
would be prepared to accept permanent production or employment safeguards for Canadian industries as part of a CTA. (In fact, the very idea
of permanent safeguards is at variance with the principles of liberalized
trade.) The United States might be persuaded to accept short-term, transitional safeguards in order to provide Canada a measure of assurance
against rapid and substantial employment losses in vulnerable industries.
However, the same objective probably could be met by the inclusion of
an adjustment provision. Because no trade negotiator can fully anticipate
the strength of future adjustment pressures, a special provision could be
included in a CTA to address the problem of unforeseen adjustment difficulties. This would operate as a "back-up" to the safeguard provision.
As it would apply only in exceptional circumstances, the language of such
a provision could be drafted so as to require the following:
* (1) for notification and consultation in respect of proposed emergency
action;
* (2) in the notification, the Party taking action must demonstrate the
urgency of, and necessity for, taking action;
* (3) the period of time permitted for such action should be limited to
eighteen months unless an extension is agreed to by the other party;
and,
* (4) to ensure that the provision is not a permanent part of the CTA, a
"sunset" clause should be included to provide for its demise in five or,
at the maximum, ten years after the CTA enters into force.
D.

RULES OF ORIGIN

Under a free trade area agreement, the member countries may maintain
different tariffs and other trade restrictions against imports from non45. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, Jan. 16, 1965, United States-Canada,
17 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093. The Agreement was enacted into U.S. law by the
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-283, 79 Stat. 1016 (1965) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. 1202, 2001, 2011-2015, 2021-2024, 2031-2033 (1976)).
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member states. This necessitates the development of rules of origin. The
origin of products that cross the common frontiers of the free trade area
must be determined so that free access can be denied to those which
originate elsewhere. The EFTA Convention permitted a product to qualify
for duty-free treatment provided that at least 50 percent of its export price
originated in the free trade area. 46 The United Kingdom-Ireland free trade
agreement of 1966 set a content requirement of 25-50 percent, depending
on the products. 4 7 Whether the rules of origin in a future CTA would be
relatively liberal or quite strict would of course be a matter for negotiation. 48 The United States, for its part, may well prefer a less liberal
approach to rules of origin. It should be noted that to the extent that both
countries maintained similar tariff levels vis-A-vis third countries, the rules
of origin problem would be somewhat diminished.

E.

TIMING OF THE AGREEMENT

In the section dealing with tariffs above, it was suggested that the trade
liberalization under a CTA could be phased in over a period of, say, ten
years for Canada and perhaps less for the United States. Because the
adjustment burden would be greater for Canada than for the United States,
it may be possible to gain U.S. acceptance of the principle that a longer
transition period is needed for Canada. Under Article XXIV of the GATT,
an interim regional trade agreement must lead to duty-free trade within
a "reasonable" period of time. However, the term "reasonable" is not
defined in GATT, and in practice GATT has accepted regional agreements
with widely varying transition periods. EFTA originally provided for a
transitional period of nine-and-a-half years; this was subsequently shortened to six-and-a-half years. 49 The 1983 Australia-New Zealand trade
agreement envisages an eight-year transition period. 5 0 Both the Standing
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Economic Council of Canada proposed an eight to ten year phase-in period. 5 1 Thus, there should
be no problem in obtaining GATT approval of a bilateral CTA under which
remaining tariffs on "substantially all" bilateral trade are removed within
a period of up to ten years.

46. EFTA, supra note 29, art. 4.
47. Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area, signed at London on Dec. 15, 1965: 565
U.N.T.S. 58, at art. 2(1) (b) (entered into frce July I, 1966).
48. Senate Committee Report, supra note 16, at 91-3.
49. See supra note 29.
50. See supra note 27.

51. Senate Committee Report, supra note 16, at 90; Economic Council of Canada, Canada's Trade Options (1975).
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While GATT places a vague overall limit on the length of the transitional
period leading to free trade, 52 there is no constraint on variations in timing
for the removal of tariffs on particular products or sectors. Thus, in cases
where Canadian or U.S. producers are currently fully competitive vis-avis their counterparts, remaining tariffs could be eliminated immediately.
In more vulnerable sectors a longer transition period will be sought. One
interesting approach would be for both countries to agree to eliminate
immediately tariffs of 5 percent or less, and to phase out remaining tariffs
by I percent per year. 53 This would confer a modest advantage on Canada
because its tariffs on dutiable industrial imports are, on average, higher
than U.S. tariffs.
F.

NON-TARIFF MEASURES

Canadian interest in a CTA is closely linked to concern over the growth
and impact of U.S. non-tariff measures, particularly those which have
often been categorized as "contingency protection" measures (the "import relief" laws) 54 and the government procurement practices of U.S.
federal and state governments. The former can be invoked by domestic
producers where it appears that dumping is occurring, or imports have
benefitted from government subsidies in their country of origin, or even
where the imports are being fairly traded but are nevertheless a substantial
cause of serious injury. There are other U.S. import relief laws, such as
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193055 (unfair trade practices and methods
of competition in the importation of products into the U.S.) and the 1916
Antidumping Act 56 (which makes dumping with intent to injure a criminal
offence) which have not received widespread Canadian attention.
The second non-tariff measure, government procurement practices, refers to the purchasing practices of public authorities. Under the GATT,
contracting parties are obliged to accord "national treatment" to one
another in respect of internal measures that can affect trade. However,
government procurement practices are excluded from 57the national treatment obligation. Article III, paragraph 8(a), provides:
The (national treatment) provisions of this article shall not apply to laws, regulations, or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies
of products purchased for governmental purposes. ...

52. GATT, supra note 40, at art. XXIV.
53. Lipsey & Smith, supra note 26, at 167.
54. See, e.g., R. GREY, UNITED STATES
VIEW 1-18 (1982).
55. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp. 1986).
56. 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. 72 (1982).
57. GATT, supra note 2, at art. 111: 8 (a).
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Government procurement practices were addressed in the last Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). An Agreement on Government Procurement was concluded, 58 but its scope and product coverage remains limited. It does not cover matters of mutual interest to
Canada and the United States, nor does it apply to subordinate governments in federal states such as Canada and the United States.
I. The Import Relief Laws
Antidumping duties can be imposed when foreign goods entering the
domestic market are priced below their home market (or fair market value)
price. The antidumping laws of both Canada and the United States have
been enacted pursuant to internationally agreed standards negotiated under the auspices of GATT. Antidumping laws have been criticized as being
essentially anticompetitive in terms of their normative content. 59 From
the antitrust perspective, when determining "material injury," they place
undue emphasis on quantitative factors such as the degree of price
suppression, while ignoring such considerations as predatory intent. A
respectable body of commentators in the United States has criticized the
antidumping (and other import relief) laws for treating actions as "unfair"
when, according to the antitrust laws, they would be regarded as procompetitive. 60 The existence of domestic price discrimination competition
laws in the United States and Canada suggests that perhaps the antidumping laws could be made non-applicable to trade governed by the
CTA, and that price discrimination that injured competition as opposed
to domestic producers may be a more appropriate standard for the CTA
(this is discussed further below 61 ).
A more serious problem for bilateral trade is posed by subsidies and
the use of countervailing measures against subsidized goods. 6 2 For Canada, the threat of U.S. countervail action against exports to the U.S.
market is a source of great concern because of the aggressive way in
58. Agreement on Government Procurement, done Apr. I1, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/21 I/Rev.
I reprinted in Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, H.R. REP. No. 153, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I at 67-189 (1979).
59. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(2d ed.); J. Barcello, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade, 57 CORNEILL L. REV. 491
(1971); Barcello, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and Proposal, 9 LAW &
POL. INT. Bus. 779 (1977); Paugh, Antitrust Principles and U.S. Trade Laws: A Review of

Current Areas of Conflict, 12

LAW

& POL.

INT'L

Bus. 545 (1980); Report of the American

Bar Association's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Antitrust and Antidumping, 43 ANTITRUST
L.J. 653 (1973-74).

60. See sources cited supra note 59.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
62. On U.S. subsidy and countervailing duty law and policy, and the growing importance
of subsidies in an international trade policy issue, see GREY, supra note 54, at 37-43; G.
HUFBAUER

& J.

VOL. 20, NO. 4
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(1984).
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which the United States deals with countervail cases. For example, as a
result of the Michelin case, 63 Canada's regional development subsidies
have been held to be countervailable under U.S. law. This was the first
time in U.S. trade law history that a domestic as opposed to an export
subsidy was countervailed. One of the most important challenges facing
the negotiators of a CTA would be to devise mutually acceptable rules
governing the use of subsidies and countervailing measures. This will be
a priority for Canada in view of the impact which U.S. policies toward
subsidies can have on jobs, exports, and investment decisions. For its
part, the United States will no doubt be anxious to see new disciplines
imposed on Canada's subsidy practices as part of any mutually acceptable
CTA.
Among the possible means of addressing the problems caused by
nontariff measures are such institutions as ajoint commission that would
have exclusive jurisdiction to settle bilateral trade disputes and the negotiation of common standards that would make the granting of relief
more difficult (due to higher standards of injury, more difficult tests of
causation, etc.).
The proposal for a joint commission with exclusive jurisdiction to settle
disputes, while an interesting idea, does not accord with traditional Canada-United States dispute settlement practice. Both states have been
reluctant to surrender sovereignty to an institution with binding powers.
Indeed, the bilateral relationship is notable for the absence of such institutions and its reliance on ad hoc procedures. Thus, while not denying
either the potential efficacy of a joint institution with recommendatory
powers or its utility as a forum for consultations, there is some doubt that
a permanent body with binding powers is feasible.
In respect of the second approach, it is conceivable that the parties
might agree to modifications of the import relief laws in matters such as:
* (1) establishing a certain share of the domestic market that must be
obtained by imports from the other party before permitting an antidumping or countervailing duty complaint to proceed. If the market
share limit were set at 15 percent, then where the other party's imports
accounted for less than 15 percent, no import relief proceedings could
be brought;
* (2) in subsidy cases involving a complaint by a subsidized domestic
industry brought against subsidized imports, the law could be changed

63. This case is discussed in F. LAZAR, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 28 (1982). X-Radial
Steel Belted Tires fron Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (Jan. 8, 1973); 46 Fed. Reg. 48,737,
(1981) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Michelin Tire & Rubber Corp. v. U.S., 49 F. Supp. 270,
(cf. Int'l Trade Oct. 26, 1981).
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to require that the "margin" of the countervailing duty would be the
difference between the domestic subsidy and the foreign subsidy (if
higher);
* (3) the standard of injury in antidumping and countervailing duty cases
could be changed from "material" injury (defined as harm that is not
unimportant or inconsequential) to a stricter standard of "serious" injury; and,
* (4) the causation test for linking the dumping or subsidization to injury
to domestic producers could be changed to require a more direct link
of causation than at present.
This approach has the attraction of making modest changes in the import
relief laws. However, it must also be said that it gives rise to some significant problems. First, the United States already distinguishes between
GATT contracting parties when determining whether a "material injury"
standard should be applied to subsidized imports: it applies a material
injury standard only in respect of imports from signatories of the 1979
GATT Subsidy Code; nonsignatories are not entitled under U.S. law to
an injury standard. In the latter case, if a foreign "bounty" or "grant"
is found, a countervailing duty is imposed without further inquiry into
material injury.64 This differential treatment has already exposed the United
States to complaints in the GATT. India threatened to convene a dispute
panel to decide whether the United States was violating its obligation
under article I of the General Agreement, which extends unconditional
65
most-favored-nation treatment to all contracting parties of the GATT.
It appears that rather than run the risk of a panel making such a determination, the United States agreed to apply the material injury test to
imports from India. This experience in the GATT suggests that the United
States' international trade obligations may lead it to resist Canadian attempts at a further differentiation in U.S. trade law (especially now that
a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is in the offing). 66 The
negotiation of standards that would make import relief more difficult to
obtain also goes directly against the recent trend in U.S. domestic law,
as exemplified by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,67 which is to facilitate

64. For a discussion of this different treatment and a defense thereof, see Hufbauer, Erb
& Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAW

&

POL. INT'L

Bus. 29 (1980).

65. See BNA ITIM, vol. 97 (Oct. 7, 1981) at 5. This question is discussed by John Jackson
in GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 159
(W. Cline ed. 1983).
66. The authors understand that the question of differential treatment continues to be

discussed in the GATT, particularly in the Working Group on MTN Agreements and
Arrangements.
67. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
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the bringing of import relief complaints and to make injury determinations
68
easier rather than more difficult to obtain.
Finally, there is doubt as to whether a change in substantive standards
would actually inhibit the frequency of import relief actions. In this regard
it is important to keep in mind the practical realities of the U.S. litigation
process. First, contingency protection actions are less expensive than
some other forms of other litigation because most of the investigation is
conducted by the Commerce Department and the ITC (rather than the
complainants themselves). Secondly, there is a considerable nuisance value
in bringing a petition for import relief; the mere rumor of an impending
petition can cause foreign producers to revise their prices upwards. This
has a chilling effect on foreign competition that is well understood by
U.S. complainants. Hence, it is far from certain that changes in the U.S.
injury definition or causation standards would themselves materially improve the situation for Canadian exporters.
There are factors peculiar to the North American relationship which
indicate that over the longer term the application of the import relief laws
to intra-North American trade should be questioned. The extent of transborder direct investment (in both directions), together with the general
similarity in the two countries' legislation dealing with commercial transactions, corporations, securities markets, and competition suggests that
attention could usefully be devoted to moving away from the essentially
mercantilistic character of GATT standards to a more liberal and
functionally-based set of standards to govern the North American market
for goods (and some services) that would be created by the reduction and
removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions.
There is no question that even on this approach agreement on subsidies
practices would be desirable. One solution might be to impose a strong
discipline on the granting of subsidies by governments at the federal and
state/provincial levels. For example, under a CTA: (1) certain practices
could be prohibited outright; (2) other permissible subsidy practices could
be subject to consultation if, in the view of the importing party, they
substantially frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or absence
of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between the parties; and,
(3) finally, were government-to-government consultations to fail, a subsidy
matter could be referred to a Canada-United States Trade Committee for
dispute settlement. The purpose of such provisions would be to impose
greater discipline on those who grant aid (i.e., the governments themselves) in return for taking subsidy complaints out of the sphere of private

68. For a discussion of the Act, see Bello & Holmer, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984:
Principal Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions, 19 INT'L LAW. 539 (1985).
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enforcement. Subsidy matters could be discussed on a government-togovernment basis; if consultations failed, then the affected party could
take "any appropriate measure" (one such measure could be to then
impose countervailing duties).
Having reached an accommodation on subsidy practices the trade agreement could then contain provisions that would protect the integrity of the
unified market being created. The second part of this approach could be
to negotiate "Fair Competition Standards." A CTA could prohibit marketing practices such as: agreements between enterprises which have as
their object or result, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the territory covered by the CTA; price discrimination
which substantially injures competition; and such other distributive practices that the parties agreed had the effect of injuring competition in the
North American market. The object of these provisions would be to shift
the focus of a trade complaint from injury to the domestic producer to
injury to competition. Thus, a CTA could dispense with the "material
injury" determination and inquire into whether a private party's actions
substantially injure competition or whether agreements between parties
prevent, restrict or distort competition. Insofar as Canada-United States
trade would be concerned, the two states would dispense with laws whose
substantive standards are suspect to begin with, and, because of the relative ease of commencing proceedings, carry considerable nuisance value.
Several considerations suggest that the two countries should move in this
direction:
* (I) Experience in other trade liberalization arrangements indicates that
a concern to remove public barriers to trade should be accompanied
by disciplines on private barriers. As Lambrinidis states in his leading work, subtle methods of trade distortion can defeat the objectives
of trade liberalization. Hence, it is "necessary to eradicate all activities the purpose and/or result of which is to distort, by artificial
means, the natural conditions of international competition which
would, otherwise, obtain." 69 Both the EFTA and the European Economic Community (EEC) have found it necessary to address private
70
firm actions.
* (2) The case for doing so in the North American context is all the more
compelling given the fact that competition policy has occupied a
more central role in the two countries (particularly in the United
States). The fact of the matter is that in respect of distributive prac-

69. Lambrinidis, supra 14, at 177.
70. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, supra note 29. art.
15; and Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, Mar. 25,
1957, 298, U.N.T.S. II, arts. 85 & 86.
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tices, there are considerable areas of commonality between the existing laws of the two countries.
* (3) There is an uneasy coexistence between the import relief and competition laws. Were the two sets of laws not reconciled with each
other, producers on both sides of the border could find that with
enhanced access they could actually be subject to more, rather than
fewer, legal actions than at present.
* (4) The fact of the matter is that U.S. courts and regulatory agencies
already claim jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive practices.
This claim is highly unlikely to change. Thus, Canadian producers
will find their actions subject to greater scrutiny (from an antitrust
perspective) than at present, both when they take advantage of increased market opportunities in the United States and when U.S.
firms take advantage of more open markets in Canada.
* (5) From the governmental perspective, as a CTA promotes the creation
of a single North American market for goods, the basis for Canada's
traditional objection to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, namely, that markets are territorially divisible, will be
eroded.
By suggesting the inclusion of competition standards as a means of
addressing the import relief laws problem, we do not contemplate the
adoption in Canada of U.S. antitrust law in toto (although we recognize
the sophistication of many aspects of that body of law). Quite the contrary:
the goal would be to draw from those areas of common approach to
marketing practices a set of standards that would govern trade conducted
pursuant to a CTA. These standards would be the exclusive grounds for
challenging unfair marketing practices. By shifting the focus of the inquiry
away from injury to domestic producers to injury to competition, relief
would be more difficult to obtain. The more problematical question of
mergers could be left out of a CTA, to be dealt with by the two national
legislatures (perhaps subject to a duty to consult). We recognize that
considerable study would have to be given to this suggested course of
action. Nevertheless, a "fair competition" standard would assist in facilitating the changes in thinking that would be necessitated by the new
trading relationship. Moreover, a failure to address competition concerns
would be counterproductive; the parties could be perpetuating overlapping and indeed contradictory legal regimes in the new trading environment.
2. Government Procurement Practices

As part of a CTA, Canada and the United States should strive to open
up markets for government purchases of goods and services to greater
competition from the other country. Both countries maintain a plethora
of laws and more informal policies at the national and sub-national levels
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of government the effect of which is to provide preferential treatment for
domestic suppliers of goods and services sold to public entities and, in
some cases, to private entities whose activities are partly funded or otherwise regulated by government. Until the Tokyo Round of GATT trade
negotiations, virtually no progress had been made in seeking to impose
meaningful international disciplines on GATT contracting parties in respect of government procurement. 7 1 During the Tokyo Round, however,
the major industrialized countries succeeded in negotiating a new code
to govern behavior in this increasingly important area. The resulting
Agreement on Government Procurement-signed by both Canada and the
United States-represents a modest effort to open up government procurement to greater international competition. 72 Code signatories agreed
to apply to each other treatment "no less favorable" than that accorded
to domestic products and suppliers in respect of the procurement practices
73
followed by selected government entities operating under their control.
However, much of government procurement-in the defense area, for
example-remains outside the ambit of the GATT Agreement. From the
perspective of Canada and the United States, it has done relatively little
to open up their respective markets for government purchases to greater
competition from suppliers located in the other country.
One approach that might be followed in a CTA would be to develop a
"national treatment" rule, whereby each country would agree to treat
suppliers from the other country as if they were domestic suppliers in its
procurement decisions. However, this probably would prove to be too
ambitious. Liberalization of procurement practices will be a gradual process, and it would not be a simple matter to reach a definitive resolution
of this issue in the CTA itself. Instead, the two countries might agree to
a provision as follows:
" The Parties recognize that the maintenance of preferences for domestic
suppliers of goods to government agencies is inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement.
" The Parties accordingly agree to work, on a reciprocal basis, to reduce
and eliminate existing preferences in relation to federal, state, and provincial government procurement.
In addition to this type of general commitment, it would be desirable for
Canada and the United States to achieve a measure of liberalization in

71. K. DAM, supra note 10, at 199-209.
72. Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 58 [hereinafter cited as Procurement Agreement]. See Macdonald, Foreign Trade Barriers to Canadian Exports and
International Law: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

73. Id. Art. 11.1
VOL. 20, NO. 4

(J. Ziegel & W. Graham, eds. 1982), at 164-66.
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government procurement matters when the CTA enters into force. This
could be accomplished by developing lists of government departments
and agencies on both sides of the border which would thereafter accord
national treatment to suppliers from the other party in their purchasing
policies.
In this connection, the situation which both countries face with respect
to other levels of government should be mentioned. Provinces in Canada
practice both "buy-Canadian" and "buy-provincial" discriminatory government purchasing policies, 74 while U.S. states have legislated many
"buy-American" laws. 75 A formal bilateral trade treaty would restrict the
ability of U.S. states to maintain purchasing preferences, but in Canada
the constitutional position of the federal government is weaker. 76 Thus,
Ottawa would have to convince the provinces to participate in a bilateral
commitment with the United States in relation to government procurement; it probably could not compel them to do so.
G.

TRADE IN SERVICES

Services comprise an increasingly important share of world trade, and
the development of more liberal rules to govern trade in services is now
a priority for the United States. 77 Barriers to trade in services are not
regulated by the GATT or other international accords, although the next
round of GATT trade negotiations will begin to address the question of
liberalization of services trade. Barriers typically take the form of domestic regulatory rules, administrative practices, licensing requirements,
and restrictions on the right of establishment. It is expected that Canada
and the United States would agree to reduce barriers to trade in at least
some services as part of the CTA.
Largely because services have not been negotiated within the context
of GATT, it is not clear exactly how amenable they would be to rules
formulated in respect of trade in goods. Moreover, it is often extremely
difficult to discern the differences between services trade and investment
issues. 78 Hence, if the two countries are prepared to loosen restrictions

74. See Stegemann & Acheson, Canadian Government Procurement Purchasing Policy,
6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 442-78 (1972); and de Mestral, The Impact of the GATT Agreement
on Government Procurement in Canada, in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO
ROUND, 171-94 (J. Quinn & P. Slayton eds. 1982).
75. Lipsey & Smith, supra note 30, at 145-147.
76. On this problem, see F. R. Flatters & R. G. Lipsey, Common Ground for the Canadian
Common Market (1983).
77. See J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, TRADE IN SERVICES: A CASE FOR OPEN MARKETS
(1984).
78. In a recent article in the JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW, Steven F. Benz stated:
The analysis of trade distortions in services becomes somewhat complex however, due
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on the right of establishment in respect of investment, they should recognize that this may erode their ability to control trade in services. This
is of particular importance when it is recalled that many services are
subject to federal or provincial/state regulatory control in order to safeguard the public interest.
We contemplate a gradual movement towards liberalization of trade in
services. First, the parties could include certain services in the CTA.
These could be set out in an annex and would be governed by the rules
of the CTA applicable to trade in goods except where significant national,
provincial or state regulatory interests dictate otherwise. This point is
extremely important. The object of applying the rules regarding trade in
goods to trade in services is to separate as clearly as possible services
trade from the provisions dealing with investment. This would protect
services industries being established by characterizing them as "investments." In addition, the inclusion of a "significant regulatory interest"
exception would be needed to protect the public interest.
Since the issues are complex and the terrain is largely uncharted at the
international level, the process of freeing up trade in services would be
an ongoing one. Thus, the CTA could provide for the establishment of a
Working Group to continue to examine ways of liberalizing bilateral trade
in services:
To ensure the harmonious development of trade in services, the Canada-United
States Trade Committee shall establish a Working Group on Trade in Services,
to examine means of further liberalization of trade in services.

H. INVESTMENT

Canada and the United States have had a number of disputes over
investment-related matters, the two most controversial being the tradeperformance requirements of the Foreign Investment Review Agency
79
(FIRA) and the "back-in" provisions of the National Energy Program.

to the thin line between trade and foreign investment in services trade. For example, in
the case of a Des Moines insurance company wishing to insure a German national, there
exists the option of exporting its insurance service from Des Moines, or the establishment
of a direct presence through a branch in Germany. In the first scenario, there is trade in
a service. In the second, the international transaction will most likely be a flow of investment capital into Des Moines resulting from the ownership of its German capital
assets.
BENZ, Trade Liberalization and the Global Service Economy, J. WORLD TRADE L. 100-101
(1985).
79. The trade performance requirements of FIRA were the subject of a GATT dispute
panel. FIRA was established by the Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, s. 2(1), 197374 Can. Stat. 620, amended by ch. 52, 1976-77 Can. Stat. 1274, repealed by the Investment
Canada Act, Bill C-15 (1984). For a discussion of the Investment Canada Act, see Note,
The Investment Canada Act: A New Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Investment in
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Recognizing that investment concerns rank high on the United States
negotiating agenda, the CTA could incorporate provisions derived from
existing bilateral investment protection treaties. We envisage the two
countries agreeing to accord the standard of "national treatment" with
respect to bilateral investment. Specifically, the parties would agree to
accord national treatment to investment originating from each other once
that investment initially has been permitted to enter the territory of the
other member state. This would not preclude the use of a screening process to examine the merits of allowing foreign investment-either in the
80
form of acquisitions or new investment-to enter in the first instance.
The purpose of a national-treatment provision rather would be to ensure
that, once foreign investors from a member state are allowed to invest in
the other member state, they will be accorded treatment identical to that
accorded to domestic investors.
Such a provision would not necessarily preclude the development of
policies designed to protect particular industries or sensitive sectors from
investment from the other signatory. Consistent with international treaty
practice, the "right of establishment" article could be qualified to permit
such screening:
Each party shall encourage and create favorable conditions for nationals or
companies of the other party to invest capital in its territory and, subject to its
right to make or to maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or
matters listed in Annex-to this Agreement, shall admit such capital.

However, the CTA should in general require each party to refrain from
discriminating against the other's investment once the decision has been
made to allow the investment to be made. It should be noted in this regard
that existing treaty practice contemplates a qualification of the nationaltreatment principle. The United States itself has insisted on protecting its
own right to restrict investment in certain sectors. 8 1 Accordingly, the CTA
could set out the national treatment principle and then provide:
The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not be construed so as to oblige
a Party to extend to nationals or companies of the other the benefits of any

treatment, preference or privilege resulting from:

Canada, 41 Bus. LAW. 83 (1985). Canada's National Energy Program was implemented,
inter alia, by the Canadian Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-82 Can. Stat. 2655. See Lacasse,
Legal Issues Relating to the Canadian National Energy Program, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 301 (1983); and B. DOERN & G. TUPPER, THE POLITICS OF ENERGY: THE DEVELOPMENT

NEP (1985). A key provision of the NEP was the reservation
for the Canadian Government of a 25 percent interest in all developments in areas known
as the "Canada Lands" (basically, in northern Canada and offshore) that began production
after December 31, 1980. This quickly became known as the "back-in" provision. Canadian
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

Oil and Gas Act, sections 27-29. See also Lacasse, supra, at 344-49.

80. Lipsey & Smith, supra note 30, 160-62.
81. See, e.g., Panama-United States treaty, supra note 6.
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(a) (taxation laws or treaties); or
(b) domestic legislation in force at the time of signature of this Agreement
relating to specific economic activities reserved to nationals or companies of a
Party.

Acceptance of the national-treatment principle may be in both countries'
best interests in the long run regardless of whether a CTA is established.
It is consistent with both GATT rules and the code of conduct of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the treat82
ment of foreign investment.
I.

INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

We envisage that as part of a CTA a permanent institutional structure
would be established. We have chosen to call this a Canada-United States
Trade Committee. This body would be charged with performing several
important functions: (I) it would supervise the functioning of the agreement; (2) it would hold consultations on any matter affecting the operation
and interpretation of the agreement; (3) it would consider ways of improving the functioning of the agreement and of the relationship over
time; and (4) it would be able to establish working groups to conduct
research and examine the prospects for further liberalization in areas that
are not dealt with definitively in the agreement itself (e.g., services trade
and government procurement preferences).
It is also to be expected that a dispute settlement mechanism would be
an integral part of a CTA. In our view, it is unlikely that the two countries
would consent to the creation of a supranational institution with binding
powers. More likely is the development of a process whereby a trade
dispute would initially trigger consultations. If this failed to solve the
matter, the Canada-United States Trade Committee would then be convened to attempt to resolve the dispute. If this too proved unsuccessful,
then either party could decide to refer the dispute to a conciliation panel
which would endeavor to resolve the problem through the agreement of
the parties. The panel would be called upon to issue a nonbinding report.
Only after all of these steps had been taken would it be open to the
aggrieved party to take appropriate measures to deal with the dispute in
question. Although each party would thus remain free to take such action,
there would nonetheless be considerable merit in the consultation and
conciliation process. It would require the parties to choose whether to
"elevate" the matter from consultations to the Committee and, in turn,
to the conciliation panel. This would provide a means for "crystallizing"
the issues between the parties. Over time, as with the GATT's dispute
82. A. E. Safarian, Trade-Related Investment Issues, in W. Cline, supra note 65, at 611.
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panel decisions, a nonbinding yet persuasive body of jurisprudence could
evolve. Moreover, the two countries might be constrained by the
consultation-conciliation process from taking precipitate action. Not until
the process had run its course would a party be free to take unilateral
measures to deal with a trade conflict.
It is a remarkable characteristic of the Canada-United States economic
relationship that even though it is extensive and multifaceted, relatively
little in the way of formal institutionalization has grown up around it.
Efforts to move toward a closer bilateral economic relationship should
be accompanied by the establishment of improved institutional mechanisms to manage the emerging bilateral system and to provide a way of
dealing with disputes and conflicts. A number of scholars recently have
proposed the creation of new institutional and conflict resolution mechanisms. 8 3 In particular, the negotiation of a CTA will require the two
countries to agree on the creation of a formal machinery both for dispute
settlement and for monitoring the operation of the agreement. In the past
Canada and the United States have relied on the GATT and on a host of
ad hoc mechanisms to deal with trade disputes and irritants. This will no
longer be sufficient once a new trade arrangement is put in place.
V. Conclusion
The bilateral trade negotiations which began in May 1986 represent a
historic opportunity for two great trading nations to improve their commercial relationship by reducing the barriers that have been erected between them and by providing a clearer legal framework to govern bilateral
trade. Many problems will have to be surmounted before an agreement
acceptable to both countries can emerge. On the Canadian side, considerable concern exists in some quarters about the magnitude and impact
of the adjustment burden that would have to be borne by domestic industries faced with an environment of freer bilateral trade. Some groups
in Canada are also of the view that liberalization of trade with Canada's
principal economic partner will threaten the existence of cultural institutions, domestic social programs, and other features of national life that,
on the surface, appear to be rather remote from the subject of a trade
agreement. For its part, the U.S. government is likely to encounter some
opposition to the idea of a trade agreement with Canada in Congress and
in a few industrial sectors presently suffering from import penetration due
to the overvalued U.S. dollar.

83. See, e.g., Cohen, Canada and the U.S.-New Approaches to Undeadly Quarrels,
INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES.

16-22 (Mar,-Apr. 1985): Drouin & Malmgren, Canada, the

United States and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 395 (1981-82).
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However, if both governments remain committed to the goal of a CTA,
there is a reasonable chance that such an accord can be negotiated. If so,
many of its elements would likely bear similarity to the proposals and
provisions discussed above. In particular, a future Canada-United States
trade agreement would almost certainly: phase out remaining tariffs on
bilateral trade in goods within a period of up to a decade; provide for a
measure of liberalization in respect of trade in selected service industries;
contain some form of national-treatment obligation in respect of investment; reflect new rules and standards as applied to a variety of nontariff
barriers and (perhaps) import relief laws; and provide for new mechanisms
and procedures to deal with bilateral trade disputes. Whether a CTA would
go further, to embrace the view that a single market is being created by
the two countries which, in turn, requires the development of common
competition policy and other standards, is more problematic. Regardless
of how a future bilateral trade agreement may be structured, the complexity and magnitude of the Canada-United States economic relationship
strongly suggests that it should be a flexible and open-ended accord suited
to subsequent modifications and improvements.
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